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SECTION 368(a) (1) (F) AND LOSS CARRYBACKS IN
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
Numerous and varied are the means by which a corporation can
restructure itself. The restructuring may be internal, as in a recapi-
talization, or external, as in acquisition of control of another corpo-
ration. The tax consequences flowing from a corporate restructuring
depend on the form and nature of the transaction. In the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, Congress defined six such transactions as
"corporate reorganizations": statutory mergers and consolidations,'
acquisitions of the stock' or assets' of one corporation by another,
transfers of substantially all the assets from one corporation to an-
other,4 recapitalizations, 5 and mere changes in form, identity, or place
of organization.6 Congress distinguished these transactions from other
restructurings by requiring specialized tax treatment: the corporations
participating in a reorganization may not recognize gain or loss ' nor
may they step-up the basis of their acquisitions.' Through section
381(b) (3), Congress also made a distinction among the types of
corporate reorganizations by allowing a loss carryback ' only to those
corporations involved in a section 368(a) (1) (F) reorganization.' °
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §368(a) (1) (A).
2id. § 368(a) (1) (B).
3 Id. § 368(a) (1) (C).
4Id. § 368(a) (1) (D).
5 Id. § 368(a) (1) (E).
6Id. § 368(a) (1) (F).
7Id. § 361.
81d. 362(b). See B. BITTKER & J. EuSTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 499-500 (2d. ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as
BITTKER & EUSTICE].
Treasury Regulation § 1.1002-1(c) (1957) provides the best explanation of the
reason for the nonrecognition of gain or loss and retention of basis when it states,
"[t]he underlying assumption of these exceptions [to the general recognition of gain
or loss and the basis change] is that the new property is substantially a continuation
of the old investment still unliquidated; and, in the case of reorganizations, that the
new enterprise, the new corporate structure, and the new property are substantially
continuations of the old still unliquidated." See also SENATE; COMM. ON FINANCE,
REvENUE BILL OF 1924, S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1924) ; HousE
WAYS & MEANS Comm., REvENUE BILL OF 1924, H. R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 13 (1924); R. HOLZMAN, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS: THEIR FEDERAL
TAX STATUS 2.23 (2d ed. 1956).
9INT. RE:v. CODE OF 1954, § 172(c) defines a "net operating loss" as "the excess
of the deductions allowed by this chapter [id. subtit. A, ch. 1B] over the gross
income."
'Old. § 381(b). The section provides that:
Except in the case of an acquisition in connection with a reorganization
described in subparagraph (F) of section 368(a) (1)-
(3) The corporation acquiring property in a distribution or transfer
described in subsection (a) shall not be entitled to carry back a net operating
(764)
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By introducing section 381 into the 1954 Code, Congress sought
to liberalize the carryback and carryover provisions by basing them
"Cupon economic realities rather than upon such artificialities as the
legal form of reorganization," " while at the same time, in section
382 (b), limiting the then common practice of acquisition by a profitable
corporation of a loss corporation, and the subsequent carryover of the
transferee's losses as an offset against the taxable gains of the
acquirer.'
2
This practice evolved from the decisions in Helvering v. Metro-
politan Edison Co.,13 and Stanton Brewery, Inc. v. Commissioner,
14
which, for the purpose of determining whether a loss carryover or
carryback should be permitted, laid down a combination statutory
merger and single corporate entity test. In Helvering v. Metropolitan
Edison Co. the respondent underwent, as a financing measure, a statu-
tory merger with one of its subsidiaries. The Supreme Court, in
permitting the carryover of the subsidiary's tax attributes to the parent
corporation, ruled that:
[A] transfer without valuable consideration, with the
intent that the transferor shall, as the statute provides, cease
to exist, made in accordance with the statute, has all the
elements of a merger and comes within the principle that the
corporate personality of the transferor is drowned in that of
the transferee.'5
In Stanton Brewery v. Commissioner, a parent corporation underwent
a statutory merger with a wholly-owned subsidiary and then attempted
to carry over the unused excess profit credits of the subsidiary."
Permitting the carryover, the Second Circuit noted that
loss for a taxable year ending after the date of distribution or transfer to a
taxable year of the distributor or transferor corporation.
In addition to loss carrybacks, the taxable year of the distributor or transferor
corporation in a corporate reorganization, id. §381(b)(1), and certain losses on
small business stock, id. § 1244(d) (2), also turn on whether there has been an F
reorganization. However, this Comment will be concerned with § 368(a) (1) (F)
only insofar as it relates to the loss carryback provisions of § 172 by way of
§ 381 (b) (3).
11 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954).
12 This was usually attempted in either of two ways: by making the loss corpo-
ration the surviving corporation, or by satisfying the statutory merger requirements
of the state of incorporation.
Representative Reed, who sponsored the House version of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, stated that this section was designed to "eliminate the trafficking-in-
loss corporations by which many businessmen [were] able to avoid their own tax
liabilities." 100 CONG. REc. 3421 (1954); see id. 3427; Susser, New Aspects of
the Net Operating Loss and Carry-over Provisions, in How TO WORK wrr THE
INTERNAL REvmUE CODE OF 1954, at 331, 338 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Susser].
13306 U.S. 522 (1939).
14 176 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1949); see Susser 338.
1'5 306 U.S. at 529 (emphasis added).
10 The actual purpose of the carryover was to offset excess profits taxes rather
than regular income taxes. For the purposes of this Comment, however, there is
no functional difference between a carryover of unused excess profits credits and a
carryover of net operating loss.
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we must regard the "resulting corporation" as the union
of component corporations into an all-embracing whole which
absorbs the rights and privileges, as well as the obligations,
of its constituents.'
7
To many taxpayers the Stanton decision seemingly permitted a net
operating loss carryover in the case of a statutory merger,-8 with the
result that
thousands of companies having substantial losses from opera-
tions or "shell" companies that had no other assets than
net-operating loss carry-overs were offered for sale. Thus,
a widespread rash of mergers developed whereby profitable
firms acquired control of corporations that were losing money
for the purpose of offsetting the gains of the former against
the losses and loss carry-overs of the latter. . . . Although
the practice was abusive and extensive, it was difficult to
check with [section 129 of the 1939 Code]."
However, if the reorganization did not involve a statutory merger,
loss carryovers and loss carrybacks were ordinarily denied, under
the rule of New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering ° In New Colonial
Ice, the "old" corporation transferred all of its assets and business
to a "new" corporation which had substantially the same capital struc-
ture, shareholders, and creditors as the old, and which had been
organized specifically for the purpose of taking over its business.'
In denying the deduction of the losses suffered by the old corporation
from the income of the new, the Supreme Court ruled that section
204(b) of the Revenue Act of 1921 22 granted the loss deduction
17 176 F.2d at 575.
18 See Susser 338. The government, however, never accepted the application
of the Stanton rationale to net operating carrybacks and carryovers, and the Tax
Court in California Casket Co., 19 T.C. 32 (1952), a case involving a carryover of
the unused excess profits of a subsidiary in a statutory merger, refused to follow
the Stanton decision. Nevertheless, there was sufficient uncertainty in the law, and
the practice of "trafficking in loss corporations" had developed to such an extent
that Congress felt impelled to make statutory changes.
19 Susser 338.
20292 U.S. 435 (1934). For a list of other cases dealing with the net operating
loss carryover provisions of the Revenue Act of 1921 see Rapp, Current Problems
with Carry-Overs and Carry-Backs Following Corporate Reorganizations, N.Y.U.
6TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 328 n.4 (1948).
21 While the issue was not discussed directly in the case, it would seem that the
transaction in New Colonial Ice was within the "mere change in identity, form, or
place of organization of a corporation, (however effected)" definition of a corporate
reorganization contained in § 202(c) (2) of the Revenue Act of 1921. See BITTKER
& EUSTIcE 607.
22 Ch. 136, § 204(b), 40 Stat. 230 provided:
If for any taxable year . . . it appears upon the production of evidence
satisfactory to the Commissioner that any taxpayer has sustained a net loss,
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only to "the taxpayer who sustained the loss" 23 and that the new
corporation could not bring itself within that category.2 4
The New Colonial Ice, Metropolitan Edison, and Stanton
Brewery cases complicated the law in this area.25  Serious tax avoid-
ance occurred when a statutory merger or loss corporation survivorship
could be shown, and yet loss carrybacks or carryovers were denied in
many legitimate reorganizations.26 Congress, in order to clarify the law,
eliminate the importance of survivorship of the loss corporation, and
limit trafficking in loss corporations, introduced sections 381 and
382(b) into the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. It is in this context
that section 368(a) (1) (F) must be examined to determine the proper
scope of the net operating loss carryback exception contained in
section 381 (b) ( 3 ).2
Section 368(a) (1) (F), Pre-Davant
Under subsection F of section 368 (a) (1), a corporate reorganiza-
tion is defined to include a "mere change in identity, form, or place of
organization, however effected." Unlike sections 381 and 382(b),
this provision was not new to the 1954 Code. Section 202(c) (2)
of the Revenue Act of 1921 2s defined a reorganization to include,
inter alia, a "mere change in identity, form, or place of organization
of a corporation, (however effected)." 29 In 1924, the words "of a
corporation" were deleted."0 There is no indication, however, that
this change in language was intended to have any operative effect, or
the amount thereof shall be deducted from the net income of the taxpayer for
the succeeding taxable year; and if such net loss is in excess of the net income
for such succeeding taxable year, the amount of such excess shall be allowed
as a deduction in computing the net income for the next succeeding taxable
year; the deduction in all cases to be made under regulations prescribed by
the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary.
(emphasis added).
2 292 U.S. at 440.
24 The strict entity theory of New Colonial Ice did not, however, prevent the
merger terms from making the loss corporation the surviving corporation, and
thereby preserving the loss carryover or carryback. See BrrrxFR & EusTicE 607;
Richardson, Planning for Maximum Use of Net Operating Loss Deduction, TUL.
3d TAX INST. 239, 247-48 (1954); cf. Susser 342.
25 See Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957), for an indication of
the degree of uncertainty.
26 See Susser 342.
27 See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
28 Ch. 136, 42 Stat. 230.
20 The legislative history of § 202(c) (2) is rather sparse. See S. REP. No. 275,
67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921) ; H.R. REP. No. 486, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1921) ;
S. Doc. No. 73, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1921). Still, it seems reasonable to believe
that this part of § 202(c) (2) was included to overule United States v. Phellis, 257
U.S. 156 (1921), which found recognizable gain after exchanges of stock pursuant
to a change of state of incorporation. See R. MOLLOY, FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS 165 (1966).
30 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(h) (1) (D), 43 Stat. 257.
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to be anything more than a "minor change in phraseology." " The
"mere change in identity, form, or place of organization, however
effected" language was reenacted as section 112 (g)(1)(E) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939; 32 in 1954, it was reenacted as section
368(a) (1) (F) .' Despite this legislative consistency, the meaning
of the "mere change" provision has always been obscure. There has
been no legislative clarification,3 4 no explanation in the Regulations,"
and, until recently, relatively little administrative or judicial attention."
The initial judicial construction of "mere change in identity,
form, or place of organization" was in 1934 in Ahies Realty Corp. v.
Commissioner." The Second Circuit stressed continuity of interest,
continuance of the business, and a lack of new shareholders. Ahles
Realty involved an exchange of its stocks and bonds, for reasons
of convenience,38 by a new corporation for all the stock and assets of
an old corporation. The sole owner of the the old corporation re-
mained the sole owner of the new corporation. The issue before the
court was whether, in determining gain or loss on subsequent sales, the
basis to the new corporation should be the fair market value of the
property on the date of the transfer, or the cost basis to the old
corporation. In ruling that the cost basis of the old corporation should
apply, the court noted:
There was a continuity of interest in the transaction, a con-
tinuance of the business conducted by the old corporation
under the modified corporate form. After reorganization,
the sole stockholder became the sole stockholder of the new,
31 H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924) ; see Estate of Bernard H.
Stauffer, 48 T.C. 277, 299 (1967).
32 Ch. 1, 53 Stat. 40.
33 The "mere change in identity, form, or place of organization" type of reorgan-
ization was deleted in the House version of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
see H.R. Ra,. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1954), but was restored by the
Senate, S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 273 (1954); Hearings on H.R. 8300
Before the Comm. on Finanwe, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 539-40 (1954); see
BraER & EuSTICE 548; Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Tarleau, & Warren, The In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954: Corporate Distributions, Organizations, and Reorgani-
zations, 68 HARv. L. REV. 393, 420 n.204 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Cohen].
3 4 See J. MERTNs, 3 LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 20.94 (1965);
Cohen, supra note 33, at 420.
35 See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2 (1955); BITTKER & EUSTICE 547.
36 BITTEER & EuSTIcE 547. The "until recently" qualification refers to Davant v.
Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967),
which touched off a virtual flood of litigation under §368(a)(1)(F). See text
accompanying notes 74-85 infra.
37 71 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1934). The case arose under the Revenue Act of 1926,
ch. 27, § 203(h) (1) (D), 44 Stat. 14, a provision identical with §203(h) (1) (D) of
the Revenue Act of 1924. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
38 The trial court apparently accepted the taxpayer's assertion, and required no
proof, that the reorganization would be more convenient. The Second Circuit did
not discuss the issue.
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and the new corporation at completion was possessed of the
same assets as the old. . . . [I]t was "a mere change in
identity, form or place of organization, however effected." 3'
The Supreme Court did not construe "mere change in identity,
form, or place of organization" until 1942 when it laid down a rather
broad "shift in proprietary interest" test. Helvering v. Southwest
Consolidated Corp.4° involved a bankruptcy reorganization in which
the assets of an old corporation were transferred under a creditors'
plan to a new corporation. Over ninety per cent of the common
stock went to the bondholders of the old corporation, and the rest was
split between the unsecured creditors and former stockholders. Sub-
sequently, the new corporation, using the old corporation's basis
attempted to deduct a substantial amount for bad debt losses. The
Commissioner disallowed the deduction on the grounds that the
reorganization did not qualify for tax-free status under section
l12(g) (1),4' and therefore that the appropriate basis was the fair
market value on the date of transfer. The Court, upholding the
Commissioner's contention, examined and rejected the application of
all the forms of reorganization contained in section l12(g) (1); as to
the precursor of section 368(a) (1) (F) the Court noted simply that:
[A] transaction which shifts the ownership of the proprietary
interest in a corporation is hardly "a mere change in identity,
form, or place of organization" . . . ."
The Court gave no further indication whether this "shift in proprietary
interest" test was meant to cover only an actual change in ownership,
that is, the introduction of new equity interests, or whether it was
broad enough to cover the ouster of a minority interest in an existing
corporation without the introduction of any new owners.3
No further light was shed on this question by the next major
case, Newinarket Manufacturing Co. v. United States.44  In New-
market, the corporation changed its state of incorporation from
Massachusetts to Delaware by establishing a shell, wholly owned sub-
sidiary corporation in Delaware, and then merging the two.45  Operat-
39 71 F.2d at 151. See also George Whittell & Co., 34 B.T.A. 1070 (1936).
40315 U.S. 194 (1942).
41 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 112(g) (1), 48 Stat. 705.
42 315 U.S. at 202-03.
4 3 Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1022 (1967), found a "mere change" where a 48% minority interest was ousted. See
text accompanying notes 76-88 infra.
44 233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956).
45 This type of transaction has been referred to as the typical F reorganization
situation. See Estate of Bernard H. Stauffer, 48 T.C. 277, 299 n.6 (1967); R.
MUSSELMAN, ALEXANDER'S FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK, 1957, at 1f 2612 (21st ed. 1957) ;
R. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 82 (3d ser. 1940). Compare Neunimarket
,with Marr. v. United States, 263 U.S. 536 (1925), a case arising under the Revenue
Act of 1916.
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ing under the 1939 Code, 40 the surviving corporation attempted to
carryback subsequent net operating losses to the pre-merger period.
The Commissioner denied the carryback on the grounds that the
Massachusetts and Delaware Newmarkets, being different legal enti-
ties, could not be the same taxpayer under the provisions of the 1939
Code. While the court rejected the Commissioner's contention of a
"different entity" and permitted the carryback on Stanton47 and
Metropolitan Edison 48 grounds, it did make specific reference to sec-
tions 381(b) and 368(a)(1)(F) of the 1954 Code, noting that "if
the provisions of the 1954 Code were applicable to the present case,
appellant Newmarket Mfg. Co. would be entitled to the claimed
refund." "
The "shift in proprietary interest' test was re-emphasized in
Hyman H. Berghash °  Before corporate restructuring, a husband
and wife were sole owners of a corporation, the husband owning 98
per cent; after the restructuring the husband owned 50 per cent, the
wife nothing, and a new stockholder 50 per cent. During this process
the husband and wife received a substantial amount of money. The
Commissioner sought to tax it as a dividend, at ordinary income rates,
rather than as a distribution in payment for the exchange of stock,
at capital gains rates.5 The Commissioner contended that the trans-
action was a sham, or alternatively, that it involved an F or a D
reorganization rather than a complete liquidation and distribution of
the old corporation.
The court rejected the latter contention, noting with regard to
the F question:
In the instant case there occurred a drastic shift in the
proprietary interest of the owner of the predecessor corpora-
tion .... Hyman Berghash, who had owned all of the stock
[except for the two per cent owned by his wife], wound up as
the owner of only 50 percent of the stock of the successor
corporation. . . . Despite the fact that all of the operating
assets were carried over to the successor corporation, which
continued exactly the same business, in the same location,
as had been conducted by the predecessor, the radical shift in
4o The characteristics of this reorganization under the 1939 Code are quite similar
to those of an F reorganization under the 1954 Code. Compare Newmarket, 233 F.2d
at 495, with Holliman v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 927, 930 (S.D. Ala. 1967) and
Casco Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 32 (1967), appeal dismissed per volle
pros., 2d Cir. June 11, 1968.
47 See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
48See text accompanying note 15 supra.
40 233 F.2d at 497.
5043 T.C. 743 (1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966).
51 See INT. REV. COnE OF 1954, §§331(a), 346(a) (1).
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stock ownership which occurred precludes us from holding
that the transaction amounted to no more than "a mere
change in identity, form, or place of organization" within
the meaning of section 368(a) (1) (F).52
Despite the emphasis of the old owner's change in proportionate
interest, the court's real worry seemed to be the reduction of that
interest coupled with the introduction of a new equity interest. 53
Indeed, where a court has found "a mere change in identity, form,
or place of organization," there has been no indication that new
equity interests were introduced into the corporation as part of
the reorganization.54
One question which none of these cases discussed is whether
a reorganization can be an F reorganization when a minority interest
is ousted from the corporation and no new shareholders are intro-
duced. 5 While the Southwest Consolidated and Berghash tests could
not be construed to cover such ousters, the first clear answer was given
in Revenue Ruling 66-284:
Where ... a plan of merger is designed only to effect a
change in the corporation's place of organization, the Internal
Revenue Service considers the failure of dissenting share-
holders owning a total of less than 1 percent of the outstand-
ing shares to participate in the plan of merger to be such
a de minimis change in the corporation's shareholders and its
assets as not to disqualify the merger as a reorganization
under section 368(a) (1) (F) of the Code. 6
5243 T.C. at 754.
53 At another point in the opinion the court said that "if a change in stock owner-
ship or a shift in proprietary interest occurs, the transaction will fail to qualify as
an F reorganization." 43 T.C. at 752 (emphasis deleted and added). But the court
did not make clear whether these are two independent tests or merely two different
ways of saying the same thing. While Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315
U.S. 194, 202-03 (1942), was cited for this proposition, perhaps a better explanation
is that the court was combining the Southwest Consol. test with the "no change in the
existing stockholders" test of Rev. Rul. 58-422, 1958-2 Cum. Buu.. 145, 146.
5 4 See, e.g., Estate of Stauffer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968);
Associated Mach. v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968); Reef Corp. v.
Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1081 (1967);
Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022
(1967) ; Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States, 233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956) ; Ahles
Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1934). Compare above with
Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942) ; Cushman Motor Works
v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1942); Hyman H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743
(1965), aff'd 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962) ;
and Stollberg Hardware Co., 46 B.T.A. 788 (1942). But cf. Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2
Cum. BuLL. 62, where the Commissioner ruled that a reorganization introducing new
equity interests of 55% qualified under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (F).
55 In such a case, there is obviously a change in the proportionate interests: the
share of the "surviving" owners is increased.
56 Rev. Rul. 66-284, 1966-2 Cumi. BuLL. 115, 116.
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Thus, prior to Davant v. Commissioner,57 section 368 (a) (1) (F)
was given a very narrow scope. 8 It applied only in those situations
in which "the surviving corporation [was] the same corporation as
the predecessor in every respect, except for minor or technical dif-
ferences;" " when "the corporate enterprise continued uninterrupted,
except perhaps for a distribution of some of its liquid assets," I or when
there was "a mere change of corporate vehicles, the transferee being
no more than the alter ego of the transferor." 0' It did not apply when
a new shareholder was introduced as part of the reorganization,62
when more than a single corporation was involved,' or when a
significant number of the minority shareholders were ousted.64
The Expanded Scope of § 368(a) (1) (F) : Davant
and Afterwards
For forty-five years, beginning with its inception in 1921, the
"mere change in identity, form, or place of organization" type of
corporate reorganization had been narrowly defined and little used.
In 1966 the Internal Revenue Service initiated a major, two-pronged
expansion of the meaning and scope of section 368 (a) (1) (F). In
Davant v. Commissioner 5 an F reorganization was held to include
the merger of brother and sister corporations, while in Reef Corp. v.
Commissioner 66 an F reorganization was held to include those trans-
actions in which less than fifty per cent of the existing shareholders
were ousted and no new shareholders came in.
In Davant, two vertically integrated corporations (X and Y)
were owned in substantially equal proportions by four families. The
original shareholders desired to transfer the operating assets of X to Y
and at the same time to withdraw a substantial amount of X's appre-
ciated corporate assets at the capital gains rates. They attempted to sell
the stock of X to "a person not connected with them or their corpora-
57366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
58 See 3 MERTENS, supra, note 34, § 20.94, at 466; Lane, The Reincorporation
Game: Have the Ground Rules Really Changed?, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1218, 1248 (1964).
69 Hyman H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743, 752 (1965).
60 Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35, 42 (4th Cir. 1965).
611 d.
6
2 See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
3See text accompanying note 81 infra; Estate of Bernard H. Stauffer, 48 T.C.
277, 299 (1967); BirrER & EusTicE 503, 507. Compare 3d example, S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 276 (1954), with 1st & 2d examples, id.
64 However, this position is the converse of that expressed in Rev. Rul. 66-284,
1966-2 Cum. BULL. 115. See text accompanying note 56 Mipra.
85 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
66368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967).
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
tions,6 7 who in turn sold the assets of X to Y, liquidated X and took
a reasonable profit for his services. The Commissioner contended
that there was no bona fide sale involved and that the transaction was
a reorganization rather than a sale and liquidation. He took the
position that to the extent of the earnings and profits of both X and Y
the gain recognized by the shareholders must be reported as a dividend
and taxed as ordinary income. The Tax Court ruled that the transfer
of assets by X to Y constituted a reorganization under section
368(a) (1) (D), but that the gain was taxable as a dividend only to
the extent of X's earnings and profits." '
On the cross appeal of both parties, the Fifth Circuit held there
was both an F and a D reorganization and that the gain was taxable
as a dividend to the extent of earnings and profits of both corporations
X and Y. As to the F question the court noted:
Whatever the outer limits of section 368(a) (1) (F), it can
clearly be applied where the corporate enterprise continues
uninterrupted, except for a distribution of some liquid assets
or cash. Under such circumstances, there is a change of
corporate vehicles but not a change in substance.6 9
Then, in the crucial part of the opinion, the court stated:
If [Y] had no assets of its own prior to the transfer of [X's]
operating assets to it, could we say that [Y] was any more
than the alter ego of [X] ? The answer is no. The fact
that [Y] already had other assets that were vertically inte-
grated with [X's] assets does not change the fact that [ Y]
was [X's] alter ego.7"
Davant was hailed as a major government victory that "materially
expand[ed] the scope of the F reorganization definition as a potent
weapon for combating the reincorporation device" 71 But while the
decision may have been a Government victory in the reincorporation
field, it was an unnecessary and potentially costly one. It was un-
necessary because the finding of a D reorganization alone would have
been sufficient to handle the liquidation/reincorporation problem pre-
67 366 F.2d at 878. In this case, the "unconnected" person was the son of the
Davant's attorney; he neither participated in the negotiations nor put up any money for
the financing of the transaction.
6 8 South Texas Rice Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 540 (1965), aff'd
in part & rev'd in part sub non. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th
Cir. 1966).
69 366 F.2d at 884.
70 Id.
7 1 BITrKER & EuSTICE, 45 (Supp. No. 2, 1968).
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sented."2 The mere fact that the types of corporate reorganizations
may overlap in certain cases " does not mean that a decision must be
grounded on all the possible ones within a given transaction. The
decision was potentially costly because its expansion of the F definition
to situations involving two (or more) ongoing concerns not only
disregarded 74 the original reasons 75 for the existence of a section such
as 368 (a) (1) (F), but also the independent significance given section
368(a) (1) (F) by section 381(b) (3). There seems to be no justifica-
tion for finding an F reorganization for the purpose of preventing a
taxpayer from carrying out a liquidation/reincorporation scheme, but
not for the purpose of permitting a taxpayer a net operating loss
carryback.
While the net operating loss carryback ramifications of section
368(a) (1) (F) may have been overlooked by both the court and the
Commissioner in Davant, they were not overlooked by the taxpayer
in Estate of Stauffer v. Commissioner." In Stauffer, the sole owner
of three separate corporations " established a fourth corporation as
a shell, and then merged into it the three previously existing ones.
After the merger the stated capital, paid-in surplus and retained earn-
ings of the fourth corporation were equal to the sum of the prior three;
the liabilities and obligations of the fourth were the same and the
business was operated as it had been before, from the same locations. 8
Stauffer, relying on Revenue Ruling 57-276, ° filed a single tax return
in which the merger was characterized as an F reorganization. At the
time, the Commissioner contested neither the characterization of the
merger as an F reorganization nor the filing of the single tax return.
72 The Government recognized the validity of this argument as well, for it argued
in its opposition to Davant's petition for a writ of certiorari that the F question had not
been properly presented to the Fifth Circuit, that it was unnnecessary to the decision,
and that Davant was not the proper case to test the meaning of an F reorganization.
Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 10-11, Davant v. Commis-
sioner, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
73 See Rev. Rul. 57-276, 1957-1 CuM. BuLL. 126.
74 The court treated the F issue in only two paragraphs, and there is no indication
that any legislative history was either presented to, or examined by, the court. See
366 F.2d at 883-84.
75 See note 29 supra.
76403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968). See also Associated Mach. v. Commissioner,
403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968). The Internal Revenue Service has stated that it will
not follow the Stauffer and Associated Machine cases, nor that portion of Davant
dealing with § 368(a) (1) (F). Rev. Rul. 69-185, 1969 INT. Rzv. BuLL. No. 16, at 11.
77 The corporations were incorporated in New York, Illinois, and California and
were engaged in the same line of business: mechanical weight reduction. It is not
clear whether the assets of the corporations were located in the states of incorporation.
Although located in the same office, the books for each corporation were kept separ-
ately, and presumably each corporation had its own employees and clientele.
78 Although a physical transfer of the assets was apparently contemplated, it had
not occurred by the time of the dissolution of the surviving corporation.
79 1957-1 Cum. BuLL. 126.
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
A subsequent business decline, however, produced net operating losses
to the fourth, or surviving, corporation. The Commissioner first
granted, and then denied loss carrybacks to the pre-merger period. The
Tax Court upheld the Commissioner on the ground that there was no
reorganization within the definition of section 368(a) (1) (F).80
On appeal, the taxpayer took the position, based largely on Davant,
that the only indicium of an F reorganization was a continuity of
ownership and business enterprise. The Commissioner, on the other
hand, virtually disowned the Davant decision. He argued that it was
an exception to the rule that "an 'F' reorganization is restricted in
number of participating corporations to one;" s that the finding of an
F reorganization was unnecessary in Davant since the decision rested
on the finding of D reorganization; 2 that even if an F reorganization
had occurred in Davant, it had not occurred in Stauffer because the
contexts were entirely different; " and that "unfortunately, the legis-
lative evidence presented to the Tax Court and this court was not
presented to [the court in Davant]." " However, this recital of the
Commissioner's litigative sins did not persuade the court to disregard
or distinguish Davant. To the contrary, in holding that the Stauffer
transaction constituted an F reorganization, the court relied on Davant:
The principle we derive from Davant is that a shift in
operating assets from the transferor corporation to its alter
ego wherein the identity of the proprietary interest remains
intact and the business enterprise of the transferor corpora-
tion continues unimpaired results in an "F" reorganization.8 5
Having laid down its "identity of proprietary interest" and "un-
impaired continuity of business enterprise" tests, the court proceeded
to distinguish the case at bar from a situation in which operational
assets are physically transferred:
Had the operational facilities of the three pre-merger cor-
porations been dismantled and transported to New Mexico
we would have a different situation. Then, the financial
status of Stauffer New Mexico would have reflected a single
operation. In such case, there would be no means by which
a loss could be pro-rated among the pre-merger identities,
and the combined losses of what was in fact the consolidation
80 Estate of Bernard H. Stauffer, 48 T.C. 277 (1967).
81403 F2d at 616.
82Id. at 618.
831d. at 619.
84Id.
85Id.
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of three companies could not have been set off against the
pre-merger income of only one of those companies, for this
would have resulted in a windfall to the transferee."
But assuming, as the court did, an "identity of proprietary interest,"
and a uniform corporate tax rate, the court's language concerning the
difficulty of prorating the loss and the possible windfalls to the trans-
feree is without significance. In effect, all that the court has done
is to present an example of impairment of the continuity of a business
enterprise, and hence no F reorganization even under the expanded
tests of Stauffer."
In the final analysis, the issue presented in both Stauffer and
Davant is: what constitutes a single economic entity. Davant and
Stauffer expanded that concept by including brother-sister corporations
within the definition,"" and by placing emphasis on whether there was
"identity of proprietary interest" and "unimpaired continuity of busi-
ness enterprise." This approach, by expanding the previously under-
stood definition of an F reorganization, opens the door to a great num-
ber of loss carrybacks not intended by Congress."9  F reorganizations
were excluded from the section 381(b) (3) prohibition of loss carry-
backs only because it was felt that the long-standing policy of allowing
corporations to "average" their gains and losses over a period greater
than one year should not be defeated by a minor change in the corpora-
tion. The Davant and Stauffer analysis, however, would allow the
result Congress intended to eliminate in 1954-offsetting taxable gains
of a profitable corporation against the losses of another corporation
through a merger with a loss corporation.9" Still, Davant and Stauffer,
both limited to the merger of commonly-owned corporations engaged in
the same or integrated activity, do not reach wholly unacceptable re-
sults. Arguably, a business divided into several subsidiary corporations
is only a step removed from a corporation with several divisions, for
which the "averaging" provisions of section 172 are available."
86 I. at 622.
87 Furthermore, once a continuity of business enterprise and an identity of pro-
prietary interest are established, whether or not the loss can be apportioned is irrele-
vant. The physical transfer of assets would be the determining factor only where the
business was of such a nature that a transfer of assets would disrupt the business and
cause a turnover in employees and customers. In the Stauffer case a transfer of assets
would cause disruption, but this is not necessarily the universal situation.
88 Compare Stauffer and Davant wuith Moldit, Inc. v. Jarecki, 53-2 U.S. Tax
Cases 48,486 (N.D. Ill. 1953).
89 Whether the rationale of Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957),
a case decided under the 1939 Code, will operate as a limiting factor is an open question.
90 See text accompanying notes 11-19 mipra.
91 That a businessman has chosen for reasons related to state law to divide his
enterprise among several corporations may not be determinative of federal tax con-
sequences. It should be remembered, however, that by forming several corporations
the businessman has also made a conscious decision related to tax consequences-that
of taking multiple surtax exemptions. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 11 (d), 1561-63.
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
But at the same time that Stauffer and Davant expanded the F
provision to include brother-sister corporations, Reef Corp. v. Commis-
sioner 92 expanded the concept of what constituted a sufficient continuity
of proprietary interest for an F reorganization. In Reef, a group of
stockholders (the Butler group) owning fifty-two per cent of a corpo-
ration (Reef Fields) wished to buy out the group owning the remaining
forty-eight per cent.93 The Butler group formed a new corporation
(Reef) in a different state, and received all of Reef's common stock in
return for a portion of their Reef Fields' stock. Reef Fields then, in
return for Reef notes, sold all its stock to a straw party, who, in turn,
sold the Reef Fields assets to Reef. Payments on the notes were made
to the old shareholders as the money was received from Reef. Disre-
garding the straw man, as both the Tax Court and the Court of Ap-
peals did, the transaction amounted to the transfer of a corporation's
operating assets to a new corporation, wholly owned by fifty-two per
cent of the shareholders of the original corporation, with the ousted
group being paid in cash and notes.
Reef Fields then filed a tax return for the period up to the date of
its dissolution, claiming a deduction for reincorporation expenses, and
reporting a non-taxable gain 94 on the sale of its property to Reef. At
the same time, Reef filed a return for the period from its incorporation
to the end of its fiscal year, 9" deducting the interest payments to the
straw man, and computing depreciation on a new cost basis, rather than
the basis carried over from Reef Fields. The Commissioner disallowed
the return of Reef Fields on the ground that the transaction constituted
an F reorganization and, therefore, the return should have been filed for
the whole year.9 The Tax Court rejected the contention that there
was an F reorganization, but disallowed the interest payments as de-
92368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967).
03 It appears from the record that the minority group in Reef was perfectly will-
ing to be bought out. However, the willingness or unwillingness of the minority
group to leave the corporation is without significance; what matters is whether the
majority has sufficient control to accomplish its aims. See Casco Products Corp.,
49 T.C. 32 (1967), appeal dismissed per ,olle pros., 2d Cir. June 11, 1968.
0
4 See INT. R-v. CODE OF 1954, § 336.
95 The fiscal years of Reef and Reef Fields coincided. Due to the fact that Reef
was incorporated before Reef Fields was dissolved, there was an overlap in the
accounting periods. Under neither the Commissioner's theory, nor that used in
filing the original returns, should there have been a period which was not reported.
However, the Commissioner sent a notice of deficiency to Reef for the whole year on
the theory that it was the successor in name to Reef Fields; and as a protective
measure sent a deficiency notice to Reef for the period from its incorporation until
the end of the fiscal year. The Commissioner neglected to send a notice to Reef
Fields for the period ending with its dissolution. As a result, there was a gap in
the reporting which created a difference of approximately $40,000 in the total tax due.
10 There is no indication why, if the Commissioner was arguing from this posi-
tion and alternatively that there was a § 368(a) (1) (D) reorganization, a deficiency
notice was not sent to Reef Field for the short period.
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ductions, and held, on the grounds of a D reorganization, that the
depreciation basis was the cost of the assets to Reef Fields."7
Both parties appealed, and the Fifth Circuit held that the trans-
action constituted both an F and a D reorganization, that the interest
deduction and step-up in basis were not allowable, and that the taxable
period was the entire fiscal year for Reef Fields/Reef. In short, it was
a complete victory for the Commissioner. The court viewed the trans-
action as two separate and unrelated transactions: the redemption of
the stock and a reorganization. It then examined whether accounting
changes, under the provisions of section 381 (b), should be governed by
the F or D reorganization rules. It held the F rules applicable.
The (F) rules are stricter than the (D) rules because a
mere change of corporate charter or state of incorporation is
not the proper occasion for wholesale accounting method
changes that would not have been permitted if no reorganiza-
tion had taken place.
Only those reorganizations which reflect a substantial
change in the corporate operation should be viewed as solely
(D) reorganizations qualifying for the more liberal rules [of
§ 381 (b) ]. Where there is no substantial change in the cor-
porate operation, (F) should be applied since it invokes the
stricter rules. 8
If this quoted discourse is indeed the basis of the court's finding of
an F reorganization in Reef, then its rationale is murky at best. Aside
from the fact that the court was stretching matters in referring to the
Reef and Reef Fields tax returns as involving "wholesale accounting
method changes," the court's analysis seems to proceed either upon a
disregard of section 381(b) (3) or a misreading of section 381(b).
The court's statement that "[S]ection 381 (b) excludes type (F) re-
organizations from the liberal treatment accorded type (D) reorgani-
zations" 99 is unsupported either in the text or in the legislative history
cited by the court.100 At least in regard to net operating loss carry-
backs, section 381 (b) is more liberal to F reorganizations than to any
other. Further, to read sections 381 (b) (1) and (2) as being designed
for the purpose of permitting changes in accounting methods is to give
them far too broad a scope. They are in the Code only to determine the
taxable year in corporate reorganizations; the question of accounting
method changes is governed by other sections.1"'
97 Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 34 P.H. Tax Ct. Memo 417 (1965).
98 368 F.2d at 136 (emphasis in original).
99 Id. at 136 n.12.
'O See id. at 135-36.
101 See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 381(c), 441-72.
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
Proceeding further on its redemption/reorganization dichotomy,
the court noted:
The Tax Court's position [that there was no F reor-
ganization] might have more force if the change in proprie-
tary interests were to new persons and less than 50% of the
former stockholders' interest in the old corporation remained
in the new corporation. Then the change begins to look like
a sale of the assets to a new and legally separate entity fol-
lowed by a bona fide liquidation." 2
There are two problems with this reasoning. First, while it is true that
there can be no F reorganization if new shareholders are introduced,
the converse is not necessarily true. In other words, the absence of new
shareholders (as in Reef) should not guarantee, without more, that a
reorganization will be classified as an F reorganization. Secondly,
there is no indication why the figure of fifty per cent is more relevant
than any other figure or relevant at all in deciding if the transaction is
a reorganization or a sale and liquidation.
Further, while giving full weight to the legislative directive that
tax consequences should turn on economic realities rather than legal
forms, the court's treatment of the Reef transaction as if it involved
"two separate and unrelated transactions" would itself seem to turn more
on form than substance. The economic significance in Reef is that
there was a drastic reduction in capital, the stockholder list was cut vir-
tually in half, and a group controlling only fifty-two per cent of the stock
of the old corporation took complete control of the new corporation.
Can such a change really be said to be without economic substance, that
is, a mere change in identity or form? 103 The court in its analysis of
the transaction seemed to focus almost exclusively on the relocation
aspects of an F reorganization, attributing the other aspects to the re-
demption; but for there to be an F reorganization there must be no
more than "a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization,
however effected." Surely, the "however effected" provision is broad
enough to include redemptions. °4
CONCLUSIONq
The Reef decision even by itself distorts the intent of Congress as
manifested in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Combined with the
Stauffer and Davant expansions, it opens the way for great abuses.
102 368 F.2d at 137.
103 See 3 IvMERTENS, supra note 34, at 466.
104 When the redemption and reorganization provisions overlap, the determination
that a redemption occurred should not preclude an examination of the F question, nor
should it necessarily control the F question. The redemption and reorganization
questions are not necessarily separable in all situations. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra
note 8, at 500-01.
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Carried to its logical conclusion, the Reef-Davant-Stauffer approach
finds an F reorganization in any corporate restructuring when more
than fifty per cent of the stockholders of the old corporation remain after
the reorganization,' °5 no new shareholders come in, and there is con-
tinuity of business enterprise. While such an expansion may provide a
significant weapon for combating liquidation/reincorporation schemes,
it is questionable whether it is worth the price, or proper, in terms of
net operating loss carrybacks. In arguing for an expansion of the F
reorganization as he did in Davant and Reef, the Commissioner seem-
ingly overlooked the fact that section 381 (b) (3) made an expanded
section 368 (a) (1) (F) a two-edged sword that could be wielded by the
taxpayer as well as the tax collector.
105 This, of course, assumes that in the case of a multi-corporation reorganization
the over 50 per cent interest in each of the corporations is composed of the same
stockholders. Cf. David T. Grubbs, 39 T.C. 42 (1962) ; Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C.
144 (1962) with regard to § 368(a) (1) (D) reorganizations.
